The price of a cinema ticket is divided between the exhibitor and the film's distributor under terms agreed before release. That division explains a great deal about how cinemas program and price.
The split moves against the exhibitor early
Distributors take their largest share in a film's opening week, when demand is highest and the exhibitor has least negotiating leverage.
The percentage then declines across subsequent weeks, so a title that holds an audience becomes progressively more profitable for the cinema showing it.
This is the structural reason exhibitors value films with long runs over those that open enormously and collapse within a fortnight.
Terms are negotiated per title, not per market
A distributor with a highly anticipated release can demand better terms, and can attach conditions about screen count and minimum run length.
Smaller distributors have less leverage and accept arrangements that leave more with the exhibitor, which affects how independent titles are programmed.
Because the terms differ by title, two films selling the same number of tickets can contribute very differently to a cinema's results.
Concessions carry the business
Margins on food and drink are far higher than on tickets, and the revenue is not shared with the distributor at all.
A cinema's profitability therefore depends heavily on how many people buy at the counter, not simply on how many pass through the door.
This explains pricing that looks perverse at the till, and it is why cinemas resist policies that would reduce the concession purchase.
Screen time is the scarce asset
Each screen offers a limited number of showings per day, and allocating one to a film forecloses every other use of that slot.
Programmers weigh expected attendance against the terms attached to each title, which is why a film with poor terms may receive fewer or worse showings.
Multiplexes manage this dynamically, moving titles between larger and smaller auditoriums as demand shifts through a run.
Shorter windows changed the calculation
The period before a film becomes available at home has contracted considerably, which compresses the weeks when the exhibitor's share is largest.
Exhibitors have resisted, since the late weeks of a run were where their economics improved, and losing them shifts the balance further toward distributors.
The negotiation over that window is now the central commercial argument in the sector, more consequential than any individual film's performance.